By Matt Piotrowski, Climate Advisers, and Mary Hellmich, adelphi

During Donald Trump’s first administration, subnational actors moved quickly to demonstrate that U.S. climate action would not disappear with a change in federal policy. The second Trump administration has presented a different challenge, with broader efforts to roll back federal climate policy and constrain the role of states and other actors driving climate action. The November 2026 midterm elections have now changed the political landscape in Washington, with Democrats winning control of both chambers of Congress. While this creates new opportunities for congressional oversight and a more contested federal policy environment, the administration retains control of the executive branch. Against this backdrop, states, cities, businesses, universities, and civil society organizations remain essential drivers of U.S. climate action. Across the country, a quieter and more durable form of climate action is taking hold at the subnational level. For European partners, these relationships remain one of the most important and practical channels for transatlantic clean-economy cooperation.

A different climate under the second Trump administration

When the federal government rolled back environmental and climate regulations during the first Trump administration states, cities, businesses, universities, and other institutions stepped forward with their own commitments. The response was loud and visible. In 2017, more than 3,800 U.S. officials from subnational actors signed the “We Are Still In” declaration, which signaled that significant parts of the country remained committed to the Paris Agreement and to reducing emissions even in the absence of federal leadership. 

The federal assault on climate action under the current administration has been materially different with broader attacks on climate policy, while the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has been substantially weakened. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act accelerated the expiration of several clean energy incentives, including credits for electric vehicles, while changing the timeline for some wind and solar incentives. The administration has also aimed to constrain state climate policies and has taken steps to dismantle federal support for renewable energy. 

At first glance, therefore, the story coming out of Washington, DC over the past couple of years might communicate to other countries that when it comes to climate action and clean economy policy, the U.S. has been closed for business. The reality on the ground, however, has told a different story. Real action, real progress, and real opportunity for collaboration with the U.S. in the climate and clean economy space exist. 

Across the U.S., states and other subnational actors continue to invest in clean energy deployment, electrification, new technologies, and, crucially, the workers who will be needed to build and maintain them. The action is often less visible than a national climate pledge. Instead, it looks more like a community college course, an apprenticeship, a workforce grant, or a partnership between a state agency and an employer.

For policymakers, researchers, companies, and civil society actors on the other side of the Atlantic, understanding how U.S. subnational action is evolving is no longer a niche interest; it is the main channel through which transatlantic clean-economy cooperation gets done. The subnational level is where, as the Germans would say, “the music is playing.” Read on to learn how subnational climate action is playing out today and to receive guidance on joining the orchestra of actors across the U.S. moving it forward. 

Building the workforce for the transition

The clean energy transition is often discussed in terms of technologies, such as solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles, heat pumps, and transmission lines. But none of these technologies, of course, deploy themselves. They require electricians, mechanics, HVAC technicians, construction workers, engineers, welders, maritime workers, and many other occupations.

States are increasingly treating workforce development as part of their climate policies.

New York provides a useful example. The state has committed $45 million to apprenticeship and pre-apprenticeship clean energy training, covering areas including building electrification, renewable energy, transmission and distribution, energy storage, and electric vehicle charging. In 2025, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) announced another $2.5 million for three workforce projects, with a goal of building a diverse pipeline of workers for the clean energy economy. 

Massachusetts offers another example. The state's first large-scale offshore wind project, Vineyard Wind 1, began delivering electricity to the grid in 2024. The project has also become a workforce development platform, supporting union jobs, pre-apprenticeship programs, and training partnerships. Massachusetts also just announced it is investing more than $4 million for workforce recruitment, training, and infrastructure for its off-shore wind industry. 

The state's workforce planning reflects the scale of the challenge. Massachusetts estimates that it will need an additional 29,700 full-time-equivalent clean energy workers by 2030. 

The same dynamic is emerging around building electrification. Massachusetts' energy efficiency programs support tens of thousands of energy efficiency and electrification jobs and are expanding contractor training for heat pump installations. Maine, meanwhile, has supported training programs for heat pump and solar technicians, including through community-based workforce programs. 

Pennsylvania provides yet another illustration of how workforce policy can connect climate-related technologies with broader economic development goals. It has expanded apprenticeship and pre-apprenticeship opportunities, while in 2026 it launched a statewide program to train and upskill HVAC workers to install heat pumps. Pennsylvania has also deepened its cooperation with Germany on apprenticeships, career and technical education, and vocational training, an example of subnational governments looking internationally for models to strengthen their workforce systems. 

North Carolina illustrates a somewhat different model, as it has used economic development planning and its community college system to prepare workers for major new investments. The state's training system has supported Toyota Battery Manufacturing through Randolph Community College, demonstrating how workforce infrastructure can be connected directly to new industrial projects. 

From training to actual jobs

Yet, there is an important caveat. Training workers for clean energy jobs is only useful if those jobs materialize.

This may be one of the most important lessons for subnational policymakers in the coming years. Workforce development cannot be separated from industrial policy, infrastructure planning, and project deployment. A state can build an excellent apprenticeship program, but if projects are delayed, canceled, or unable to secure financing, graduates may find themselves with credentials but nowhere to use them.

That is particularly relevant after the changes to the IRA. Some federal clean energy programs have been terminated or curtailed, while others remain available or are tied to projects already underway. The result is a more uncertain investment environment. The fate of programs such as Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Solar for All also remains subject to litigation. In September 2026, a federal judge ruled that the administration had unlawfully terminated the $7 billion program, although the administration may appeal. 

The next phase of subnational action

The next phase of subnational climate action may continue to look less like the first Trump-era response.

There may be fewer dramatic declarations, with ambition instead tied to permitting decisions, transmission investments, community college curricula, apprenticeship programs, procurement choices, and economic development plans.

Potential permitting reform at the federal level could reinforce this trend. Faster development of transmission and other electricity infrastructure would create additional demand for skilled workers while supporting new wind and solar capacity. But workforce planning will need to move alongside infrastructure planning.

For workers who have spent decades in a particular industry, work is often part of their identity, community, and sense of purpose. A transition cannot necessarily be judged successful simply because a new position pays a comparable salary. Retraining programs may need to recognize the importance of occupational identity, geographic ties, and established career pathways alongside wages and credentials.

And then, of course, there is artificial intelligence. As AI changes manufacturing, engineering, construction, and administrative occupations, today's workforce development systems will need to prepare workers for both clean energy technologies and the rapidly changing workplace.

The change in congressional control following the November 2026 midterm elections adds another dimension to this evolving landscape. A Democratic-controlled Congress could create opportunities for renewed federal-state collaboration, including through legislative initiatives, oversight, and efforts to sustain investment in clean energy and infrastructure. However, with the Trump administration retaining control of the executive branch, significant differences over climate policy, funding, and regulatory authority are likely to persist. The next phase of subnational action will therefore involve not only building capacity independently, but also identifying opportunities to work with a changing federal policy landscape where interests align.

A practical agenda

The practical agenda is therefore relatively straightforward, even if implementation is not. States and communities can continue strengthening community college curricula and apprenticeship programs, build stronger relationships between employers and training providers, and make sure training programs are aligned with actual project pipelines. They can also make it easier for workers, including those transitioning from legacy energy industries, to move through training without losing income or access to essential services.

One key takeaway is that subnational climate action does not always announce itself as climate action.

It can look like a heat pump technician learning a new system, an apprentice preparing for work on a transmission project, a community college developing a curriculum alongside a new manufacturer, or a state quietly building institutions needed for the clean energy industry to grow. 

For international partners, a clearer picture of how climate action continues across the U.S at the subnational level is only part of the solution. Knowing who to engage within the U.S. and how to connect with them are the keys that can unlock the doors of opportunity. Read on to see our guide for how European partners can effectively engage with subnational U.S. actors to develop collaborative relationships for climate action. 

U.S. subnational climate diplomacy: a how-to guide for European partners 

For those on the other side of the Atlantic, the natural next question is: Given this landscape, where would a state government, regional authority, company, or civil society actor in Europe begin? The subnational U.S. climate and clean-energy landscape can look sprawling from across the Atlantic — and international news coverage on the state of the transatlantic relationship can make outreach intimidating. Despite these hurdles, however, there are established entry points, several of which have supported transatlantic cooperation for years and want outreach from Europe.

US diplomatic networks in Europe 

The easiest first step for most European actors is the U.S. diplomatic network in their own country. The U.S. maintains a regional network of Embassies and Consulates General across Europe. Their economic and commercial officers typically already track business ties, investment interests, and clean energy developments in their district. This makes them a practical first call for anyone unsure where else to turn. A European counterpart can reach out to the Embassy or Consulate General which covers their region to get the ball rolling on their U.S. engagement, rather than trying to identify a counterpart inside the U.S. first. 

European diplomatic networks in the U.S.

The mirror image of this is European countries’ own diplomatic network inside the U.S. These networks are useful once a European actor already has a U.S. region in mind or wants a broker for introductions from their own country. In addition to European countries’ Embassies in Washington, DC, and the Delegation of the European Union to the U.S., countries maintain Consulates General across the U.S., each covering a defined regional district. These missions already have standing relationships with state governments, economic-development agencies, and business communities in their region. 

Business networks

On the business side, bodies such as the German-American Chambers of Commerce (AHK/GACC) operate regional offices across the U.S. with deep, existing ties into state business and economic-development ecosystems — a natural fit for German companies, investors, or regional economic-development organizations looking for a first point of contact.

A related and often-overlooked resource is the Transatlantic Business & Investment Council (TBIC). While not a climate-specific body, TBIC is the leading representative of North American economic-development organizations in Europe, connecting European companies with U.S. states and communities competing for investment. Because so much subnational clean energy activity in the U.S. is driven by manufacturing and industrial investment — battery plants, EV suppliers, grid components — TBIC's network of economic-development organizations and its foreign direct investment focused programming can be a useful, already-established bridge for European actors whose interest in U.S. clean-economy cooperation is investment-driven rather than purely policy-driven.

Already have a U.S. State in mind?

For partners who already know with which U.S. state they would like to connect, the most receptive entry point is usually the state's official economic-development organization — bodies like the Georgia Department of Economic Development or the Michigan Economic Development Corporation. These organizations are eager to engage because clean energy maps naturally onto their core mandate of investment and job creation. 

For questions specifically about grid capacity or renewables integration, state public service or utility commissions are the right counterpart. For workforce-related cooperation, state workforce boards or community college systems are a strong starting point: Georgia Quick Start and South Carolina’s trifecta of Apprenticeship Carolina, readySC and retrainSC are all examples of workforce infrastructure that welcomes international partnership without requiring any particular political alignment. Finally, where they exist, state trade or international affairs offices can offer a government-to-government channel distinct from the economic-development agency.

If the topic is clear

It may be that a European actor knows on which topic it would like to engage — grid modernization, EV supply chains, apprenticeship models — but not yet the right U.S. partner. For these cases, the Council of State Governments, through its regional divisions (Midwest, South, East, and West), is designed precisely to connect outside partners to the states most active on a given issue, making it a useful switchboard for narrowing a broad topic down to a workable set of state-level counterparts.

Shifting frontiers

Federal policy in the U.S. still matters enormously. The scale and speed of the country’s emissions reductions cannot be determined by states and cities alone, but the current period suggests that subnational climate action is helping fill a federal vacuum by building capacity and ensuring that the people who build the next energy system are ready when the opportunity arrives. For European partners, now is precisely the moment to engage. Building state-level relationships now is a strategic investment in durable transatlantic cooperation, creating channels for collaboration that can endure political change in Washington and complement opportunities for renewed federal engagement.